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Abstract
Aggregate and systemic risk in complex systems are emergent phenomena depend-
ing on two properties: the idiosyncratic risks of the elements and the topology of the
network of interactions among them. While a significant attention has been given to
aggregate risk assessment and risk propagation once the above two properties are given,
less is known about how the risk is distributed in the network and its relations with
the topology. We study this problem by investigating a large proprietary dataset of
payments among 2.4M Italian firms, whose credit risk rating is known. We document
significant correlations between local topological properties of a node (firm) and its
risk. Moreover we show the existence of an homophily of risk, i.e. the tendency of
firms with similar risk profile to be statistically more connected among themselves.
This effect is observed when considering both pairs of firms and communities or hierar-
chies identified in the network. We leverage this knowledge to show the predictability
of the missing rating of a firm using only the network properties of the associated node.
keyword financial networks - corporate networks - credit risk - credit rating - ma-
chine learning
JEL classification: C45 - C88 - G21 - G33 - L14
Assessing the aggregate risk emerging in complex systems is of paramount importance in
disparate fields, such as economics, finance, epidemiology, infrastructure engineering, etc..
A large body of recent literature has explored, both theoretically and empirically, how risk
propagates [Pozzi et al., 2013] and how to assess aggregate risk when the risk of each individ-
ual entity is known [Nier et al., 2007], as well as the topology of the network of interaction
among them. Both aspects have been shown to be important, however their mutual rela-
tion is relatively less explored. In theoretical studies, one typically assumes independence
between idiosyncratic risk and topology, while in empirical studies the correlation is the one
present in the investigated dataset.
But what is the relation (if any) between the idiosyncratic risk of a node and its local
topological properties (e.g. degree, centrality, community, etc)? In this paper we answer this
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question by studying a specific system where the assessment of aggregate risk is particularly
important, namely the network of interaction between firms. Assessing the risk of firms is
one of the fundamental activities of the credit system. Banks spend a significant amount of
resources to scrutinise the balance sheet of firms in order to obtain accurate estimations of
their riskiness, the internal rating, and provide credit conditions reflecting both the capability
of the firm to repay the loans and its probability of default. The riskiness of a firm depends on
many idiosyncratic factors (e.g. balance sheet, structure of management, etc.) as well as the
industrial sector or its geographical location [Treacy and Carey, 2000, Crouhy et al., 2000,
Crouhy et al., 2001]. However, corporate firms do not live in isolation but interact with each
other on a daily basis. The interactions can be of different kinds, including those due to the
supply chain, payments, business partnerships, financial contracts, and mutual ownership.
The structure of interactions is complex and multifaceted but its knowledge is critical both
for macroeconomists and for the credit and banking industry to understand the dynamics of
the economy, the business cycle, the structure of corporate control, and, of course, the risk
of firms (in isolation or in aggregation).
Here we study the interplay between the risk of firms and the interlinkages connecting
them. The network is built from a large proprietary dataset provided by a major European
bank. The dataset contains the payments collected at daily granularity between more than
two million Italian firms together with the information on internal risk rating for a large
fraction of them. We want to understand whether and in which measure a firm’s role in the
network can be informative of its riskiness. This is important for two reasons. First, even
if the risk of a firm is not known to all the counterparts, it may affect its ability to interact
with other firms. For example, a poor rating (i.e. high riskiness) may prevent the access to
credit and as a result it may cause a reduction or delay in payments toward suppliers. If
the supplier has high risk, the missing or delayed payment can prevent its own payments,
increasing the likelihood of a cascade of missing payments and a propagation of financial
distress. The second reason is that, in certain cases, the knowledge of the riskiness of a firm
or a group of firms is lacking or imprecise. In these cases, the existence of a correlation
between network properties and risk can allow or improve the assessment of risk. Indeed,
in the last part of the paper we will show how network properties of a node can be used to
predict the risk of the corresponding firm.
Previous works on networks of firms focussed mainly on ownership [Kogut and Walker, 2001,
Souma et al., 2006, Vitali et al., 2011, Romei et al., 2015, Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017], or
dealt with the modelling but not with the empirical part [Huremovic and Vega-Redondo, 2016].
Exception are the empirical studies on the the Japanese economic system [Ohnishi et al., 2009,
Watanabe et al., 2012], where links represent buyer-supplier relationship between, but with-
out the information on the amount of money exchanged. In the seminal work [Acemoglu et al., 2012],
even if the theoretical framework applies also to single firms, the empirical part focuses on
the aggregate, sector network, due to lack of more granular data. The use of payments
as a proxy of interactions between economic entities is not new and has been investi-
gated mainly for banks [Sorama¨ki et al., 2007, Rørdam et al., 2009, Battiston et al., 2012,
Bargigli et al., 2015, Fukuyama and Matousek, 2016] in the context of systemic risk studies,
where, however, other choices to characterise interactions are possible [Elliott et al., 2014,
Cimini et al., 2015, Affinito and Pozzolo, 2017, DErrico et al., 2017]. Apparently much less
is known about the payment network between firms, mostly because of lack of data. As
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for rating prediction, it can be embedded in the now broad literature of classification prob-
lems [Friedman et al., 2001]. The idea of employing machine learning techniques in credit
rating scoring has been explored before [Altman et al., 1994], but in that case the pre-
dictors for the rating are all derived from balance sheets, so the results are not compa-
rable with ours. Other works use more heterogeneous information to predict the rating
[Wilson and Sharda, 1994, Grunert et al., 2005, Lee, 2007, Parnes, 2012].
This paper contributes to these streams of literature in several aspects. First, we in-
vestigate the topological properties of payment networks by considering standard network
metrics, such as degree and strength distribution and components decomposition. We find
that the large payment networks investigated in this paper share the properties observed in
other complex networks, namely they are sparse but almost entirely made of a single com-
ponent, they are scale free and small world. Then, we look into the distribution of risk of
firms in the network of payments in order to quantify the dependence between the network
property of a node or a group of nodes and the risk of the firm represented by the node(s).
The main and most innovative contribution of this paper is to document the existence of
such correlations. We find an homophily of risk, i.e. the tendency of a firm to interact
with firms with similar risk. This is a two nodes properties, but a similar behaviour is ob-
served, even more clearly, also at larger aggregation scales. Communities of firms, detected
by using different methods, often display a statistically significant abundance of firms of a
specific risk class, indicating the tendency of firms with similar rating to be linked together
through payments. Risk is therefore not spread uniformly on the network, but rather it is
concentrated in specific areas. This implies that an idiosyncratic shock on a single firm can
propagate more or less quickly depending on the local network structure and the community
the node belongs to. The last contribution, is to exploit this correlation between risk of a
firm and network characteristics of the corresponding node to predict the risk rating of the
firm using network properties alone. To this end, we employ machine learning techniques
to build classifiers for risk rating whose inputs are only network properties (e.g. degree,
community, etc.). We show that our classification method has a good performance both in
terms of accuracy and of recall and that outperforms significantly random assignments.
1 The network of payments
1.1 The dataset
The investigated dataset contains information on payments between more than two million
Italian firms and is built from transactional data of the payment platform of a major Euro-
pean bank. Transactions are registered with daily granularity for the year 2014, for a total of
47M records, each of which includes the two counterparts involved, date, type, amount and
number of transactions in the same day. Transactions are originally identified by account,
but in case of customers and former customers, multiple accounts associated to the same
firm are aggregated into a single entity1. This results in a total of 2.4M entities (which
will be referred to as firms, for brevity) operating through the platform during the whole
1In order to comply with privacy regulation any payment from or to physical persons is excluded, moreover
the filter is implemented to exclude any ambiguous record.
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investigated period. The counterparts can be of different types. In principle, any firm or
public body can make use of the platform, but in practice in most cases at least one is a
customer of the bank. Similar considerations hold for the total amount exchanged: in each
month more than 50% of the volume is transferred between customers, and it rises to above
95% when considering transaction with at least one customer involved. More details on the
dataset and some descriptive statistics is presented in A. For customers, the dataset contains
information on the economic sector and on the internal rating of the firm on a three value
scale: Low (L), Medium (M), and High (H) risk.
1.2 Networks definition and basic metrics
A network, or graph, is identified by two sets: V , the sets of nodes with cardinality |V | = n,
and E, the sets of links or edges, with cardinality |E| = m. The latter is the collection
of ordered pairs of connected nodes. In our case, we also take into account the strength of
interactions so a weight wij is associated with each link. Starting from transaction data,
payment networks are constructed as follows: given a time window, each node represents a
firm active in that period, if there is payment between two firms a link from the source to the
recipient is added, with weight equal to the payment amount. If multiple transactions occur
between the same (ordered) pair of nodes, the weight of the link is the sum of the amounts of
the payments. Therefore for each time period we construct a directed and weighted network.
The time window of analysis may vary depending on the type of information one wants to
extract from the dataset. In the following the focus will be on monthly networks, for which
results are quite stable, at the cost of dealing with fewer and larger graphs. For the period
covered by the dataset, each monthly network consists on average of n = 1M nodes and
m = 3.2M links with the lowest activity in August and the highest in July (see A.1). The
density ρ = m
n(n−1) is thus small, resulting in a so called sparse network. Nevertheless this
low density does not imply a disaggregated system. Indeed for all the networks the diameter
is very small compared to the size: on average starting from a node, one has to pass at most
19 links to reach any other node in the weakly connected component (see Table 1). Thus
the networks have the so called small-world property.
1.3 Networks topology
When considering a small number of firms, one would expect simple topologies: one firms
is the supplier of intermediate products for another firm, resulting in a line (the simplest
supply chain), or one firm is a supplier or a buyer for many others firms, resulting in a
star network. Instead what is observed is a much more complex organisation, with a non
negligible presence of cycles.
At a very coarse level, it is possible to identify two large classes of firms. The first
constitute the core of the network, which includes approximately 20% of the nodes and more
than half of the links. This core has a density an order of magnitude larger than that of the
whole network and it is characterised by the fact that any pair of firms is connected, directly
or via intermediaries. Around 60% of the total volume circulates among the nodes of the
core. The other class is made of payers-only, i.e nodes that have no incoming links. These
represent each month about one half of the active firms and their activity is sporadic. To
4
Table 1: Basic metrics of the network of payments
nodes links in-degree out-degree density diameter
month n m E[k(in)] E[k(out)] ρ = m
n(n−1) d
Jan 1,000,555 3,271,861 6.61 4.20 3.27 · 10−6 20
Feb 997,006 3,067,029 6.11 3.98 3.09 · 10−6 18
Mar 1,018,164 3,146,559 6.19 3.98 3.04 · 10−6 18
Apr 1,047,706 3,346,763 6.52 4.09 3.05 · 10−6 19
May 1,048,803 3,359,315 6.58 4.08 3.05 · 10−6 20
Jun 1,039,876 3,239,886 6.30 4.02 3.00 · 10−6 19
Jul 1,091,393 3,510,435 6.44 4.14 2.95 · 10−6 20
Aug 891,587 2,319,697 5.21 3.44 2.92 · 10−6 19
Sep 1,041,124 3,465,233 6.80 4.25 3.20 · 10−6 20
Oct 1,066,044 3,289,946 6.11 4.00 2.89 · 10−6 18
Nov 1,023,692 3,103,365 6.15 3.90 2.96 · 10−6 18
Dec 1,052,975 3,000,284 5.60 3.74 2.71 · 10−6 19
better understand the role of this significant subset of firms we check their customer status
and we find that the majority of them are unclassified, and that their number is larger than
one expects from the unconditional distribution among all the firms. This means that likely
they are not customers and, more importantly, almost no information, for example about
risk, is available on them. For further details on this refer to A.3.
We now turn our attention to the distribution of degree and strength. In our case the in-
(out-) degree is the number of payers (payees) of a given firm and the corresponding amount
of Euro. For the monthly aggregation case the average in- and out-degree of a firm is 6 and
4, respectively (see Table 1). These low values are a direct consequence of the low density of
the network. However the degrees and the strengths are extremely heterogeneous as testified
by the degree and strength distribution.
Figure 1 shows the empirical cumulative distribution for these two quantities in a double
logarithmic scale. The approximately straight line indicates the presence of a fat tail with
a power law behaviour. The fit of the exponent supports the observation that in- and out-
degree distribution data are consistent with a power-law tail and the estimated exponents
are around 2.6 and 2.8, respectively. Similarly, in-strength and out-strength are well fitted
by power-law distributions of exponents around 2.1 and 2, respectively. Despite the fact that
a large fraction of nodes is different in each month, the tail exponents are remarkably stable
(see Table 6 of the A.3).
This scale free behaviour is quite ubiquitous in complex networks has been found in many
other real economic and financial networks [Serrano and Boguna´, 2003, Garlaschelli and Loffredo, 2005,
Boginski et al., 2005, Boss et al., 2004, Kim et al., 2002, Huang et al., 2009, Ohnishi et al., 2009].
The fat-tailed distribution for the degree has two interesting consequences: first, there is no
characteristic scale for the average degree or strength; second, there are a few nodes that
act as hubs for the system, in the sense that, having a large amount of connections, many
pairs of nodes are connected through them. This partially explains the low values for the
diameter.
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Figure 1: Empirical complementary cumulative degree (left) and strength (right) distribu-
tions and their power law fit. The scale is logarithmic for both axes. Data refers to January,
but results are similar for the other months.
Finally, we measure the tendency of firms to be connected to firms which are similar
with respect to some attribute, namely the number and the total volume of connections (i.e.
degree and strength). Following [Newman, 2002], we compute the assortativity coefficient
for a categorical variable,
r =
∑
i eii − aibi
1−∑i aibi (1)
where eij is the fraction of edges connecting vertices of type i and j, ai =
∑
j eij and bj =∑
i eij. It is rmax = 1 for perfect mixing, while when the network is perfectly disassortative
(each node connects to a node of a different type) it is rmin = −
∑
i aibi
1−∑i aibi . Using the number
of connections as categorical variable, an high value for the assortativity coefficient indicates
that highly connected firms tend to interact significantly more than average with other highly
connected firms. Similar reasoning holds using the volume exchanged as categorical variable.
Beside the entire graph, we also consider the subgraph of firms with rating and the
subgraph of customers. The assortativity coefficient is consistently slightly negative for both
attributes, for all months and graphs, namely around −0.03 for the entire graph and the
subgraph of firms with rating, and −0.04 for the subgraph of customers, with no strong
differences among months and attributes. Table 7 of A reports the summary of values of
the assortativity coefficient for each month. A possible explanation can be that large, very
interconnected firms are connected to many subsidiaries which in turn do not engage with
many other firms, being their business almost exclusively focussed on the relationship with
the large and central firms.
To summarise, each month the payment network of firms is very sparse but almost entirely
connected. Half of the firms appear in the network as payers only (no incoming links) and
they are mainly unclassified with respect to customer status, so no much information is
available on them. Of the remaining nodes, almost half constitutes the denser core of the
network where more than a half of the transactions occur and above 60% of the volume
circulates. Finally the network is small world, scale free, and slightly disassortative both for
degree and for strength.
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2 Risk distribution and network topology
In this Section we investigate the distribution of risk of firms in the network of payments.
We are interested in measuring the dependence between the network property of a node
or a group of nodes and the risk of the firm represented by the node(s). We proceed in a
bottom-up fashion, zooming out from single nodes to subsets. At first we consider a firm’s
local property (the number of connections) and we check if it correlates with the risk. Then
we consider pairs of linked firms and measure the homophily in risk, i.e. whether firms with
similar risk profile tend to do business together and thus to be linked. Finally, we divide firms
into subsets induced by the network structure and we check whether the inferred subsets are
informative with respect to the riskiness of the composing firms. Specifically, we partition
the network in groups (or communities) of firms by using only network information, and we
test if the distribution of risk within each group is statistically different from the global one.
Thus the goal is to understand if the inferred communities are homogeneous with respect to
the risk profile of the composing firms: a community with many firms with high risk rating
is a clear indication of financial fragility and a possible source of instability, since the distress
of one or few firms of the community is likely to propagate to the other firms.
For the sake of brevity, in the following the analysis is carried on for one month, but
results are consistent for all the months.
2.1 Degree and risk
The first investigation is on the relation between the degree of a firm and its risk. The
probability for each risk level r ∈ L,M,H conditional to the out-degree is computed2 and
plotted against the degree. The results are shown in Figure 2. We notice an interesting
correlation between degree and risk: small degree nodes are more likely medium risk firms,
whereas large degree nodes are more likely low risk firms. The high risk firms are more evenly
spread across degrees, even if a larger fraction is observed for low degree nodes. To assess
if the three curves are statistically different we perform a multinomial logistic regression
on data [Greene, 2003] (the solid lines in the plot). This choice is justified by the fact the
quantities just described are the probabilities of outcomes in a multi-class problem given an
independent variable (the degree). The estimated probabilities follow quite closely the trend
of the empirical distribution and the coefficients are all significant. More detailed results of
the fit are given in table 8 of B.1 (first two columns).
The correlation just highlighted can be, at least in part, influenced by the effect of the size
of the firm (in term of assets value from the balance sheet): a large firm is usually considered
less risky than a small one, at the same time, a larger size generally implies a higher number
of connections, as seen for example in the interbank network [Bargigli et al., 2015]. As the
size of firms is not available to us, we use the sum of the incoming and outgoing amounts as
proxy. Defined in this way, the size has a Pearson correlation of around 0.19 , 0.15 with in-
and out- degree, but a Spearman rank correlation of 0.67 , 0.57 respectively. To control for
the effect of the size, we repeat the same procedure on subsets of firms, grouping according to
their size into tertiles. The results, not shown here but available upon request, hold true also
2The results for the in-degree are qualitatively very similar.
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Figure 2: Probability of rating of a firm conditional to its out-degree. The solid lines show
the fitted multinomial logistic distribution, with its confidence intervals (dashed lines) in
matching colours.
on the sub-samples, but slightly less sharply. We repeat the multinomial logistic regression
adding the size tertiles among the predictors, and we still obtain statistically significant
coefficients (last four column in 8 of B.1).
Similarly, the three conditional degree distributions given the rating result statistically
different, as for every month all pairs reject the null hypothesis in the 2-sample Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test [Smirnov, 1939]. Therefore topological characteristics (the degree) of the node
can be used to obtain information on the riskiness of the corresponding firm. From a risk
management perspective this is an important results, since on average highly connected
nodes are also less risky.
2.2 Assortative mixing of risk
The next step is to check whether risk is correlated with direct connection preferences.
To clarify this point, we consider two features: the assortative mixing of the risk and the
conditional distribution of rating given the distance.
In the first case we compute a weighted variant of the assortativity coefficient in Eq.
(1) using as categorical variable the risk rating rather than the degree or the strength. In
practice, the quantities eij are substituted by e˜ij, the fraction of volume from nodes of type i
to nodes of type j. The reason for this choice is to mitigate the impact of the aforementioned
large number of uncategorised payers. In most cases their links are associated with low
volume and few transactions. Also, customer firms, even if they represent only around 1/3
of the firms, exhibit a generally more intense activity, both in terms of number of transactions
and of volume, hence accounting for the stronger ties between the firms.
The metric is positive for all the three graphs, 0.070, 0.157, 0.163 for the whole set,
the nodes with rating, and the customers, respectively, with significant variability across
the months but always positive sign3. In Table 9 of B.2, the summary of values of the
3Results for the standard assortativity coefficient are quite different, and the choice of the subgraph
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assortativity coefficients for each month is presented.
With the same quantities e˜ij we define metrics to assess different preferences in connection
between incoming and outgoing payments. We test if firms are more concerned with the risk
of payers than of the payees by testing for different risk distribution between incoming and
outgoing connection. To discriminate between these two cases, for each node i we compute
the percentage excess of volume with respect to the average toward nodes in certain risk
class and we group according the rating of the node. The distributions are compared using
MannWhitney U test [Mann and Whitney, 1947]. This non-parametric test allow to assess
if one distribution is stochastically greater than the other. Details on the metrics and the
test performed are given in B.2. We find that it is likely that firms are, at least in part,
aware of the riskiness of their counterparts and results suggest they use this information in
choosing their business partners. However the hypothesis that incoming payments show a
more marked preference for low risk is not supported by data. Moreover the overall positive
assortativity is mainly due to low risk nodes. This suggests that low risk firms are more
careful in the choice of their business counterparts, possibly also because their relative larger
creditworthiness allow them to find available partners more easily.
The quantities considered so far in this section are pairwise comparisons between the
rating of nearest neighbours, and give an aggregate measure. A possible4 way to enrich this
information is to consider the conditional distribution of rating for nodes at a given distance5
and to compare it to the unconditional distribution. In the case of no influence of the rating
on the connection pattern, the conditional distribution of risk given the distance should be
statistically undistinguishable from the null unconditional distribution. To test if this is the
case, we first compute the distance between all the nodes for which the rating is available.
Then for any fixed k, the occurrences of ratings are computed by looking at the set of pairs
at distance k. Finally, the estimated distributions are tested against the null one with an
hyper-geometric test, as explained in details in B.3.
Results for April are summarised in Figure 3, which considers the case when the source
node is in class L. Results are similar when considering a medium or high risk source. For
each k a marker indicates the percentage of nodes with low (green circles), medium (yellow
squares) or high (red diamonds) risk at distance k. A marker is full when the percentage is
statistically different from the null distribution (the dashed lines, with matching colours).
We note that up to distance 5 the class of low risk firms is significantly over-represented
in the distributions. At greater distances, medium and high risk groups are over-represented.
This means that more steps in the networks are necessary to reach riskier firms. This fact is
particularly interesting when considering that each firm is in theory unaware of others firms’
ratings and in some cases even its own.
appears to be crucial. When considering the entire network, the assortativity coefficient is negative, around
−0.07, hence indicating a slightly disassortative behaviour with respect to risk. The subgraphs, instead,
show an assortative tendency, with coefficients around 0.025 and 0.038 for the nodes with rating and for
customers, respectively. This shift can be explained again by the impact of the large number of uncategorised
nodes.
4An alternative strategy to go beyond first order neighbours in the computation of assortativity has been
recently proposed by [Arcagni et al., 2017].
5The distance between nodes in a network is defined as the length of the shortest directed path connecting
two nodes, where a path is a sequence of links. Clearly, in a directed network in general d(u, v) 6= d(u, v)
and moreover d(u, v) can be not defined (or ∞) if there is no path from u to v.
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When considering the same quantities for incoming paths, results (not shown) are very
similar, namely at short distances the low risk class is over-represented, while medium and
high risk nodes are over-represented for longer distances.
Figure 3: Distribution of ratings for nodes at distance k from a node with rating L. The
dashed lines are the unconditional (null) distribution of ratings among nodes in the entire
sample. A full marker indicates that the over or under representation with respect to the
null distribution is statistically significant in the hyper-geometric test at 1% significance level
with Bonferroni correction.
A possible explanation for these observations is that among the hubs of the systems (i.e
the most connected nodes) firms with rating L (i.e the most creditworthy) constitute the
vast majority. This holds true when considering both in-coming and out-going links, and
including also the nodes with no rating. Moreover, they are in the denser core previously
described, while many high risk firms have a few or no out-going links and they are peripheral
in network. This asymmetry in the position in the network is observed also when considering
the distribution of the closeness centrality [Newman, 2010] of the nodes, i.e the harmonic
mean of the distances to all other nodes, conditioning on the risk class (not shown6).
2.3 Network organization and risk
In this Section we study the relation between the organization of the network at a more
aggregate level and the distribution of risk. We are interested in two types of organization
of networks into groups. The first is the modular organization: each module is composed
by nodes, which are much more connected among themselves than with the rest of the
network. In economic terms modules could represent, for example, firms operating in the
same region or area, and the high density of the module reflects the fact that payments are
more frequent with geographically close firms. We saw before that the network shows an
assortative tendency with respect to risk, so we want to test if the homophily on risk can be
observed beyond pairwise relationship.
6Results available upon requests
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The second is a hierarchical organization. Since the payment network is directed, we
look for a ranked partition (i.e. each group of nodes is labelled with an integer from 1 to
the number of groups M) such that most links are from nodes of low rank classes to nodes
in high rank classes. This type of organization could represent, for example, a supply chain
and the flow of payments between the firms of a group and those in the group in the next
rank class reflects the (opposite) flow of goods or services. This classification is important
because a high risk concentration in low class nodes of a strongly hierarchical network can
trigger a cascade of distress in the higher rank classes.
Modularity and hierarchy are conceptually opposite as the first penalises connections
towards other groups, which instead are encouraged in the latter (provided that they go
from low rank to high rank nodes).
For each metric, we proceed in the following way:
i. find the optimal partition according to the criterion;
ii. compute the distribution of ratings within each subset of the partition;
iii. test whether such local distribution is statistically different from the overall distribution
of ratings by employing the hypergeometric test used in the previous Section and
described in B.3. In order to have a sample large enough to perform the test, we only
consider subsets with at least 500 known ratings.
We showed so far that the structure of the payments network is very complex. Since our
goal is to obtain information on the risk of the firms, it can be helpful to filter the network
before performing communities detection, in order to keep the most relevant connections.
Thus we focus on the subgraph of customers. The reasons for this choice are many. First,
the percentage of nodes with rating active every month is quite low, around 20%, but it
raises to 70% when considering only the customers (see Table 4 in A.1 for a summary). This
will help having a more informative local distribution of risk when considering subsets of
nodes. Secondly, more than a half of the volume is transferred between customers (see Table
3 in A.1), so even if a large fraction of transactions is dropped, we are mostly pruning weak
connections, while keeping the strongest ones. Finally, as it has been shown in the previous
Subsection about assortativity, considering the entire network can be misleading, especially
when looking at the connections without considering the weights, as it will be necessary for
some metrics.
2.3.1 Modular structure
One of the standard methods for inferring a modular structure in a network is via modularity
maximization. This method divides nodes into subsets, called modules, such that nodes are
well connected with other nodes in the same module and there is a smaller number of links
with nodes in other modules. Given a partition P in modules C the modularity is
Q =
1
2m
∑
C∈P
∑
i,j∈C
(
Aij −
kini k
out
j
2m
)
(2)
where Aij is the (i, j) element of the adjacency matrix and k
in
i (k
out
i ) is the in- (out-) degree of
node i. The optimal partition is the one which maximizes modularity. Despite the associated
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Figure 4: Distribution of ratings in the three partitions, modularity (top), hierarchy (bot-
tom). The dashed lines are the unconditional (null) distribution of ratings among nodes in
the entire sample. A full marker indicates that the over (above the dashed line) or under
(below the dashed line) representation with respect to the null distribution is statistically
significant in the hypergeometric test at 1% significance level with Bonferroni correction.
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optimisation problem is NP-Hard, fast and reliable heuristics for an approximate solution
exist, and here the well known Louvain method [Blondel et al., 2008] is employed.
In each month we find that the optimal partition has around 2, 000 modules. These
are really heterogeneous in size: for example, the 13 largest ones cover more than 95% of
the nodes of the network. We perform the hypergeometric test of the null hypothesis of an
homogeneous distribution of risk in each module with at least 500 known ratings. These are
less than 1%, around 19 every month. (see Table 10 in B.3 for more details). These are clearly
very large modules but a significant number of them shows an over or under-expression of
one or two risk classes.
For some specific module it is possible to draw statistical robust conclusions on its risk
profile. The top panel of Fig. 4 shows the over- or under-representation for the largest
modules for January. The seventh module, for example, has an over-representation of firms
with low risk and an under-representation of the other two risk profiles, thus it represents a
group of firms with small risk. On the contrary the eighth module has an over-representation
of highly risky firms and under-representation of low risk firms, representing a possible
warning for the bank.
2.3.2 Hierarchical organization
We now consider explicitly the directed nature of the payment graph and the hierarchical
organization of the network. An ordered partition is such that each subset is associated with
an integer number (rank) r ∈ {1, ...,M}. A graph has a hierarchical organization if nodes
are more likely linked to other nodes with a higher rank [Simon, 1991], such as in military
organizations or in administrative staff. Finding the optimal ordered partition and revealing
the hierarchy of a graph is in general complex and requires the minimization of a suitable
cost function, similarly to what is done with modularity.
In this paper we use a recently proposed cost function [Gupte et al., 2011]. Given a rank
function r : V → {1, ...,M}, the cost function penalizes links from a high rank node to a low
rank node. The penalization is a linear function of the difference between the ranks. Thus
the optimal hierarchical partition is obtained by solving the optimisation problem
A∗ = min
r∈R
∑
(u,v)∈E
f(r(u)− r(v)) ,
where R denotes the set of all ordered partitions and the cost function is
f(x) =
{
x+ 1 x ≥ 0
0 x < 0
.
The hierarchy of the graph is defined by
h∗(G) = 1− A
∗
m
.
By definition, h ∈ [0, 1], and 0 is the value for the trivial partition with only one set,
while h = 1 is obtained when the network is a Directed Acyclical Graph and it signals
a perfect hierarchy. The linear choice of the penalization function is convenient because
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the associated optimisation is solvable in polynomial time and few exact algorithms exist
[Gupte et al., 2011, Tatti, 2017], while non-linear forms can lead to NP-hard problem.
We apply the hierarchy detection to the monthly networks of payments and the results
are summarized in Table 11 of B.3. First of all we notice that the number of inferred classes,
roughly 18, is much lower than in the modular case. Moreover the size of the classes is
much more homogeneous. The value of h is also quite stable, around 0.75, indicating a
strong hierarchical structure, a remarkable result considering that we are studying only the
customers network.
We now consider the distribution of risk in each class and we study the over or under-
expression of certain levels of risk as a function of the rank of the class in the inferred
hierarchy. The test rejects the null hypothesis of uniform risk distribution a considerable
number of times (also compared with the total number of subsets in the partitions). As
displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 4, low rank classes have an over-expression of high
and medium risk firms, while middle and low rank classes (i.e. r ∈ [8, 12]) have an over
expression of low risk firms and an under-expression of medium and high risk firms. More
details on the test results are given in This empirical evidence may signal the presence of
paths of risk propagation, since low rank firms, typically more risky, are payers of high rank
firms, which are instead less risky. We now consider the distribution of risk in each class
and we study the over or under-expression of certain levels of risk as a function of the rank
of the class in the inferred hierarchy. The test rejects the null hypothesis of uniform risk
distribution a considerable number of times (also compared with the total number of subsets
in the partitions). As displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 4, low rank classes have
an over-expression of high and medium risk firms, while middle and low rank classes (i.e.
r ∈ [8, 12]) have an over expression of low risk firms and an under-expression of medium and
high risk firms. More details on the test results are given in This empirical evidence may
signal the presence of paths of risk propagation, since low rank firms, typically more risky,
are payers of high rank firms, which are instead less risky. We now consider the distribution
of risk in each class and we study the over or under-expression of certain levels of risk as a
function of the rank of the class in the inferred hierarchy. The test rejects the null hypothesis
of uniform risk distribution a considerable number of times (also compared with the total
number of subsets in the partitions). As displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 4, low rank
classes have an over-expression of high and medium risk firms, while middle and low rank
classes (i.e. r ∈ [8, 12]) have an over expression of low risk firms and an under-expression of
medium and high risk firms. More details on the test results are given in 11 in B.3. This
empirical evidence may signal the presence of paths of risk propagation, since low rank firms,
typically more risky, are payers of high rank firms, which are instead less risky.
2.4 Discussion
Both investigated partitions give interesting insights on the relationship between risk and
network structure. On one side, the percentage of rejected tests in the case of modularity
partition is consistent with the observed assortativity of risk. It may be noticed that the
preference for low risk business partners is not always a realistic option, because in some
sectors business partners are not replaceable for geographical reasons. To better assess this
point, one possibility could be to include the comparison between modules and geographical
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location of firms, which is not available to us. On the other side, the hierarchical partition
appears to follow the risk distribution slightly better and this is probably related to the
peculiar conditional distribution of risk with respect to the distance described in Subsection
2.2. Indeed, given the fact the high risk nodes are over represented for longer distances, they
should be located in extreme positions in the ranking, either at the top or at the bottom, and
this is what is observed. It must be stressed that in the case of the two methods chosen here,
one does not exclude the other, as they give different and complementary standpoints for
interpretation. In this sense a multi-dimensional perspective is needed, where the dimensions
are the mechanisms that either favour or discourage the creation of business relationships.
3 Missing rating prediction using payments network
data
In the previous Sections we showed that network metrics can be informative of the risk of a
firm. It is therefore natural to ask whether it is possible to predict the missing risk rating
of a firm by using only information on network characteristics of the corresponding node,
as well as risk rating of the neighbour firms. This problem is particularly relevant since
we noticed that around 30% of the customers in the dataset do not have a rating and this
percentage is even higher when the entire dataset is considered (see table 4 in A.1).
Here we use network characteristics as predictors for the missing ratings into well known
methods of machine learning for classification problem. The predictors we employ are the
following:
i. in- and out-degree;
ii. weighted fraction of (in- and out-) neighbours with a given rating (H,M,L or NA)
iii. rank of the class in the hierarchy inferred by agony minimisation;
iv. membership in community inferred by modularity maximisation;
v. sum of in- and out-strength.
The fractions in (ii.) are computed considering the amount (weight) of each payment and
are together a measure for rating assortativity, while (v.) is a proxy for the size. Data are
preprocessed following [Friedman et al., 2001] so that variables are comparable in order of
magnitude, as detailed in Appendix C.1. These transformations result into a total of 25
predictors. The dataset is the one which includes only the customers, and we consider the
monthly network for January. In order to assess the performance of the prediction, we train
each model using 75% of the data, and the remaining 25% is used for testing.
We consider three methods for classification:
i. multinomial logistic;
ii. classification trees;
iii. neural networks.
See [Friedman et al., 2001] for a review of these methods.
The class H is under-represented in the sample, as it includes only around 10% of the
firms with rating. This affects the ability of any classifiers to recover this class. This is
undesirable, since the class H the most critical for the riskiness.
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To address this issue we proceed with a 2-step classification strategy for all the three
methods. The intuition behind this strategy is to train a classifier more specialised in the
recovery of one specific class at the first step, and then separate the remaining classes in the
second step. In the first step we fix a risk class, say L, and we merge the other two classes
into a fictitious class X. We fit a first instance of the chosen model on the modified database.
In the second step, we train another instance of the model only on the two previously merged
classes. This is repeated for all the three risk classes. In the case of class H being the one
selected for step one, we apply SMOTE [Chawla et al., 2002] before training, a well-known
algorithm for data rebalancing.7.
Once the models are trained, the prediction are obtained by iterating the following two
steps for each risk class (see the schematic representation in Figure 5)
i. apply the first step classifier;
ii. if the entry is classified as X, apply the second step classifier.
Figure 5: Schematic representation of the 2-steps classifier
The final prediction is the median of the predictions. In case of draw, more weight is
given when the class is obtained from the first instance (as the classifier is more specialised).
For the 2-steps method, the random classifier can be defined in the following way: the
null distribution for the first step is obtained for each classifier, by taking into account the
fictitious class, and at the second step by considering only the two classes previously merged.
Table 2 shows the results for each classifier, together with the value for the same metrics
computed for the random classification. In the case of classification trees and neural net-
works, different combinations for the hyper-parameters have been tested (such as depth for
the trees, and number and size of hidden layers for neural networks), here we present the
results for the best choice for each model, and in Supplementary Information we explain the
selecting procedure.
The three models behave quite similarly, with slightly better overall performance of neural
networks, and the training times are comparable. It must be noted that, among the predictors
7Using SMOTE in the 1-step classification would also be an option if the objective were to use the
classifier as a first filter to detect possibly critical nodes. However, we found that the overall performance
of the classifier is quite poor, especially when considering the cost of classifying as highly risky (H) a firm
which is creditworthy (L).
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Table 2: Accuracy and recall for 2-steps classifiers. R: random, ML: multinomial logistic,
CT: classification tree, NN: neural network.
method accuracy recall
L M H
random 1-step 0.413 0.438 0.625 0.108
random 2-steps 0.366 0.368 0.391 0.249
multinomial logistic 0.477 0.553 0.452 0.253
classification tree 0.496 0.502 0.567 0.151
neural network 0.505 0.526 0.559 0.166
only network deduced metrics have been included, while any data from the balance sheet,
which is likely to represent the main source for the risk rating model, as well as the sector
or geographic location, are excluded. When adding the economic sector, which is the only
metadata available to us, as further predictor the prediction power only slightly improves to
from 49%− 50% to around 52% of accuracy for both classification trees and neural networks.
The natural benchmark models are the random classifiers, both 1-step and 2-steps, due to
the total lack of data employed in the proprietary rating model. We are able to outperform
the first by 30% to 38%, and the latter by 15% to 22% in term of accuracy, and especially
in the case of neural network, we are able to find a good compromise with recall for H.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we empirically study the interactions and the risk distribution of 2 million
Italian firms, via the investigation of payments networks built from transactional data.
Our contribution is threefold. On one side, the empirical study of the relationship between
the high number of firms to our knowledge has not been done before, especially with this
granularity. The study of the structure of the network highlights a complex interdependence
between firms; indeed particularly interesting is the presence of a relatively small core of
firms, which are involved in most transactions. This feature, paired with the power-law tail
distribution of the number of connections and the total volume exchanged by the firms, can
be a symptom of an architecture which favours the spread of distress, or positive feedbacks.
Also relevant is the observed tendency of large, well-connected firms to be connected to small
(in terms of exchanged volume), poorly connected firms. This can be the result of almost
exclusive relationships between a big producer and its subsidiaries.
The second and main contribution is the assessment of the correlation between the net-
work structure and the distribution of risk. From our analysis, we can conclude that the risk
level of a firm is related to its features and role in the network at different levels. For single
firms, we observed that low risk firms are more likely to have a high number of connections,
and some of them acts as hubs for the entire network, being connected to thousands of other
firms. When pairs of linked firms are considered, we observed the tendency to favour connec-
tions towards firms with the same risk level. This tendency can be observed also on a more
aggregate level. Indeed, we found that also groups of firms which are more connected among
them that with the rest of the network, have a local distribution of risk which is statistically
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different from the global one, meaning that some risk classes are over- or under- represented.
Finally, we divided firms into a hierarchical organisation, in such a way to highlight the
main direction along which money circulates. This simplified structure showed once more
that many levels of the hierarchy have a local distribution of risk statistically different from
the global one. As high risk firms are over-represented at the beginning of the flow of money,
this can be a source of distress for the entire system.
Finally, we showed that network metrics and communities can be successfully used to
predict the missing ratings with machine learning models. We propose a simple 2-steps
strategy to compromise between overall accuracy and recall on the smallest but most risky
class. We test our strategy with three methods, namely multinomial logistic, classification
trees and neural networks. Since predictors are all network-derived quantities, and no infor-
mation from balance sheets or other meta-data are used, the random rating assignment is
the natural benchmark. We find that all the three methods are able to outperform sizeably
the benchmark, with slightly better results for neural networks.
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A Dataset and network metrics
A.1 The dataset
The dataset is built from transactional data of the payment platform of a major Italian bank
for a total of 47M records. In table 3 the details of the exchanged volume by customer status
is presented. Table 4 shows the distribution of rating across the firms, disaggregating them
in terms of their customer status.
Table 3: Percentage of volume by customer status, the row indicates the status of the payer,
the column the recipient
month no yes ex NA no yes ex NA month
Jan 0.000 0.036 0.001 0.001 no 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 Feb
0.009 0.604 0.030 0.110 yes 0.027 0.543 0.037 0.154
0.000 0.046 0.002 0.003 ex 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.002
0.000 0.149 0.002 0.006 NA 0.000 0.184 0.001 0.000
Mar 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 no 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 Apr
0.023 0.541 0.037 0.151 yes 0.023 0.525 0.033 0.155
0.000 0.036 0.000 0.002 ex 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.002
0.000 0.193 0.001 0.000 NA 0.000 0.199 0.003 0.000
May 0.000 0.018 0.000 0.000 no 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 Jun
0.023 0.542 0.035 0.144 yes 0.018 0.534 0.037 0.172
0.000 0.040 0.000 0.001 ex 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.001
0.000 0.194 0.001 0.000 NA 0.000 0.189 0.001 0.000
Jul 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 no 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 Aug
0.019 0.538 0.031 0.181 yes 0.018 0.591 0.029 0.140
0.000 0.031 0.000 0.002 ex 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.001
0.000 0.183 0.001 0.000 NA 0.000 0.172 0.005 0.000
Sep 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 no 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 Oct
0.019 0.599 0.027 0.131 yes 0.022 0.581 0.029 0.141
0.000 0.032 0.000 0.001 ex 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.001
0.000 0.175 0.001 0.000 NA 0.000 0.175 0.000 0.000
Nov 0.000 0.015 0.000 0.000 no 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 Dec
0.013 0.578 0.037 0.165 yes 0.012 0.578 0.036 0.194
0.000 0.031 0.000 0.001 ex 0.000 0.028 0.001 0.001
0.000 0.158 0.000 0.000 NA 0.000 0.137 0.000 0.000
A.2 Time aggregation
When defining a network from temporal data, choosing the time scale of analysis is crucial
because it can affect deeply the topology. Shorter time scales (daily or weekly) emphasise
peculiar behaviours as, for example, which supplier is paid first once liquidity is available.
Longer time scales help giving a more stable picture of the supply chain structure among
firms.
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Table 4: Average monthly distribution of nodes by customer status and rating.
status rating count % %with rating
L 2121 0.000
not customer M 4592 0.003 0.010
incl. NA H 305 0.000
ND 676762 0.990
customer
L 87801 0.305
M 95893 0.333 0.702
H 18811 0.065
ND 85841 0.298
former
L 3901 0.017
M 7850 0.179 0.340
H 926 0.017
ND 41775 0.767
total 1026577 0.217
In order to give an intuition of different behaviours, two quantities can be considered.
The first is the persistence of links and nodes, which is measured by counting the number
of times a node or an edge appears in the networks for different time aggregations. From
Figure 6 one can see that most of nodes are active only for few days, while a small core of
firms is intensely active through the whole year. Secondly, the size of the networks, both
in terms of number of nodes and links, for different time aggregations is shown in Figure 7.
Interestingly, for daily aggregation, see Left panel, both quantities show a high periodicity,
with a very high peak (a factor ∼ 5 with respect to the other days) at the end of each
month. This effect is evident also with weekly aggregation, see (central panel), but not in
the monthly time scale. This last observation justifies the choice of monthly networks as
focus of this analysis.
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Figure 6: Histogram for the number of days, weeks, months of activity for nodes (blue) and
existence for edges (green) for different time aggregations
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Figure 7: Number of nodes (blue) and links (green) for each day, week, and month. Only
with longer time aggregations one is able to eliminate periodicity.
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A.3 Network metrics
A network’s component is a subsets of nodes such that there is path between any pair of
nodes, either undirected (weakly connected components), or directed (strongly connected
components). From the definition of the networks it is clear that there are no isolated
nodes, since the smallest weak components include at least two nodes, namely a payer and
a payee. As it is common for many other real networks, it is possible to identify a weak
component, which is of the order of magnitude of the entire network. In our case this giant
component (GC) includes on average 98% of the nodes. Considering instead the largest
strongly connected component (SCC), it includes approximately 20% of the nodes but more
than half of the links. As a consequence the density of the strongly connected component
is an order of magnitude larger than the density of the whole network or of the weakly
connected component. See Table 5 in for more details of these quantities.
In the standard definition of the bow-tie structure of a network, the nodes in the GC
but outside the strongly connected component are divided between the in-component, the
nodes from which links arrive in the strongly connected component, and the out-component,
the nodes reachable from the SCC. Nodes in the in-component that have no incoming links,
represent each month about one half of the active firms and their activity is sporadic.
Table 5: Percentage size (%n) and density (ρ) of the largest weakly (GC) and strongly (SCC)
connected components. The last column (%w) contains the relative volume transferred
among nodes in the SCC with respect to the total volume.
GC SCC
month %n ρ %n ρ = m
n(n−1) %w
Jan 0.989 3.4 · 10−6 0.232 3.29 · 10−5 0.75
Feb 0.989 3.21 · 10−6 0.237 2.99 · 10−5 0.69
Mar 0.980 3.15 · 10−6 0.235 2.98 · 10−5 0.70
Apr 0.980 3.16 · 10−6 0.231 3.09 · 10−5 0.67
May 0.981 3.16 · 10−6 0.232 3.06 · 10−5 0.69
Jun 0.980 3.11 · 10−6 0.230 3.03 · 10−5 0.69
Jul 0.982 3.05 · 10−6 0.237 2.88 · 10−5 0.70
Aug 0.970 3.08 · 10−6 0.204 3.23 · 10−5 0.69
Sep 0.981 3.31 · 10−6 0.233 3.23 · 10−5 0.73
Oct 0.981 3.00 · 10−6 0.237 2.81 · 10−5 0.68
Nov 0.979 3.08 · 10−6 0.227 3.00 · 10−5 0.65
Dec 0.979 2.81 · 10−6 0.228 2.69 · 10−5 0.67
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Table 6: Results of power law fit of the degree and strength distribution for all the months
obtained by using the algorithm described in [Clauset et al., 2009]. The α parameter is the
fitted exponent and the kmin and wmin parameter is the estimated minimum value after
which the behaviour of the distribution is consistent with a power law tail. Since the volume
of payments are scaled, the values of wmins are not much informative, so for the strength
F (wmin) = 1− EDCF (wmin) is reported instead.
degree strength
month αin kinmin α
out koutmin α
in F (winmin) α
out F (woutmin)
Jan 2.55 159 2.85 24 1.89 0.03 1.89 0.01
Feb 2.56 148 2.80 19 2.10 0.03 1.99 0.01
Mar 2.53 125 2.70 44 2.11 0.03 1.97 0.01
Apr 2.67 257 2.82 22 2.14 0.03 2.01 0.01
May 2.66 227 2.83 23 2.12 0.03 2.07 0.01
Jun 2.58 135 2.83 23 2.07 0.03 1.96 0.01
Jul 2.52 124 2.80 21 2.07 0.03 2.02 0.01
Aug 2.62 236 2.74 14 2.07 0.03 1.94 0.01
Sep 2.64 187 2.83 32 2.09 0.04 2.03 0.01
Oct 2.53 129 2.75 25 2.05 0.03 1.95 0.01
Nov 2.59 134 2.83 19 2.06 0.03 2.04 0.01
Dec 2.55 180 2.62 41 2.06 0.03 1.98 0.01
Table 7: Assortativity coefficient for degree and strength. The columns with rating refers to
the subgraph of nodes with known rating. The columns customers refers to the subgraph of
nodes with customer status yes.
attribute degree strength
nodes all with rating clients all with rating clients
Jan -0.035 -0.035 -0.046 -0.036 -0.031 -0.046
Feb -0.027 -0.029 -0.036 -0.030 -0.031 -0.039
Mar -0.025 -0.030 -0.038 -0.027 -0.027 -0.037
Apr -0.027 -0.027 -0.037 -0.030 -0.029 -0.041
May -0.026 -0.033 -0.039 -0.027 -0.026 -0.035
Jun -0.025 -0.027 -0.032 -0.028 -0.030 -0.037
Jul -0.025 -0.028 -0.036 -0.028 -0.028 -0.038
Aug -0.027 -0.035 -0.040 -0.032 -0.034 -0.041
Sep -0.024 -0.027 -0.030 -0.028 -0.030 -0.036
Oct -0.028 -0.028 -0.037 -0.032 -0.033 -0.043
Nov -0.023 -0.028 -0.031 -0.026 -0.028 -0.035
Dec -0.027 -0.030 -0.034 -0.031 -0.035 -0.041
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B Risk distribution
B.1 Degree and risk
The multinomial logistic regression aims to model the probabilities for a classification prob-
lem with more than two outcomes. Here we treat the responses (L, M, H) as categorical
and ordered. In practice this means to find parameters that best fit the model
log
(
P (r ≤ L)
P (r > L)
)
= aL + b
1
LX1...+ b
p
LXp+
log
(
P (r ≤M)
P (r > M)
)
= aL + b
1
MX1...+ b
p
MXp+
. Xi are the predictors, a and b
i
· are the coefficients. We consider the cases p = 1, where the
predictor is the degree X1 = k, and the case p = 2 where also the size is used as predictor
X2 = s. In the following table 8, the b coefficients are shown, together with an indication
for the statistical significance.
Table 8: Coefficients for multinomial logistic regression. The first two columns refer to the
regression with the degree as only predictor. The last four columns refer to the regression
with also the size as predictor. The superscript indicates the predictors: k for the degree,
s for the size. The subscript indicates the risk rating. The stars indicate significance: one
star if the p-value < 0.05, two stars if the p-value < 0.01
bkL b
k
M b
k
L b
s
L b
k
M b
s
M
Jan 0.258 ** 0.352 ** 0.261 ** -0.007 0.312 ** 0.091 **
Feb 0.221 ** 0.305 ** 0.210 ** 0.024 ** 0.233 ** 0.159 **
Mar 0.226 ** 0.314 ** 0.220 ** 0.013 0.237 ** 0.173 **
Apr 0.243 ** 0.328 ** 0.240 ** 0.007 0.270 ** 0.131 **
May 0.229 ** 0.324 ** 0.206 ** 0.051 ** 0.237 ** 0.195 **
Jun 0.239 ** 0.325 ** 0.232 ** 0.017 * 0.237 ** 0.199 **
Jul 0.238 ** 0.344 ** 0.227 ** 0.026 ** 0.263 ** 0.187 **
Aug 0.183 ** 0.272 ** 0.175 ** 0.020 * 0.179 ** 0.211 **
Sep 0.238 ** 0.355 ** 0.218 ** 0.046 0.255 ** 0.228 **
Oct 0.220 ** 0.329 ** 0.207 ** 0.030 ** 0.232 ** 0.220 **
Nov 0.226 ** 0.338 ** 0.211 ** 0.034 ** 0.233 ** 0.234 **
Dec 0.219 ** 0.331 ** 0.220 ** -0.002 * 0.231 ** 0.227 **
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B.2 Assortativity of risk
Table 9: Assortativity coefficient for risk rating. The columns with rating refers to the
subgraph of nodes with known rating. The columns customers refers to the subgraph of
nodes with customer status yes. In the last two columns, the metric for assortativity is
modified in order to take into account weights, specifically eij is computed as the fraction of
volume, not the number of edges (see main text for more details).
metric standard weighted
nodes all with rating clients all with rating clients
Jan -0.063 0.025 0.035 0.073 0.115 0.109
Feb -0.066 0.026 0.038 0.106 0.181 0.188
Mar -0.067 0.025 0.039 0.073 0.150 0.150
Apr -0.067 0.026 0.036 0.069 0.154 0.156
May -0.067 0.025 0.038 0.065 0.146 0.139
Jun -0.068 0.026 0.039 0.060 0.150 0.128
Jul -0.072 0.025 0.037 0.046 0.142 0.137
Aug -0.078 0.025 0.040 0.078 0.149 0.224
Sep -0.067 0.025 0.040 0.087 0.168 0.216
Oct -0.076 0.024 0.037 0.080 0.151 0.213
Nov -0.072 0.024 0.039 0.070 0.175 0.149
Dec -0.082 0.024 0.040 0.037 0.199 0.151
To test if nodes show different preferences in connection between incoming and outgoing
payments we define the quantities
∆
(in)
i (X) =
w
(in)
i (X)− a˜X b˜r(i)
1− a˜X b˜r(i)
, X ∈ {L, M, H}
∆
(out)
i (X) =
w
(out)
i (X)− a˜r(i)b˜X
1− a˜r(i)b˜X
, X ∈ {L, M, H} .
The notation is consistent with the definition in (1): r(i) is the risk of node i; a˜X , b˜X
are the percentage volume from or to nodes with rating X for the whole network, w
(out)
i (X)
(w
(in)
i (X)) is the percentage of the volume from (to) node i to (from) nodes of rating X. Sam-
ples are obtained by grouping nodes by rating, for a total of 18(= (3 ratings)2 · 2 directions)
distributions. For example, the distribution of excess percentage volume from L towards M
is given by
{∆i(M)(out) | i ∈ L} ∼ F (out)L (M) .
Similarly, the excess percentage volume entering M from H is given by
{∆i(H)(in) | i ∈M} ∼ F (in)M (H) .
Note that in general, F
(in)
X (Y ) 6= F (in)Y (X).
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We perform two set of test. In the first case we fix one rating and we compare out-
and in- excess percentage volume with respect to a certain rating. In all the cases the null
hypothesis is rejected with very low p-values, however it is not straightforward to give an
economic interpretation of the overall results: for all the rating, the excess percentage toward
L is greater that the analogous for incoming volume, while the opposite holds for payments
to and from H. In the second set of test we fix a rating and a direction (in or out), and
we compare the excess percentage volume from (or to) all the ratings. Also in this case all
the tests reject the null with very low p-values, so we are able to order the distributions
and evaluate the preference in connection. For the outgoing volume, rating L is preferred to
the more risky ones in all the case. Payments to nodes rated M follows in preference from
nodes having risk M and H, but are last in order for nodes having rating L. For incoming
payments, the situation is slightly different. Rating M is preferred by nodes rated M and
H, and it is followed by L. While the preference is reversed for payments from nodes rated
L.
B.3 Test for risk distribution within a community
The statistical test employed in the main text has the purpose to assess whether a given rating
is under- or over- represented in a certain subset, obtained by one of the partitioning methods
described in the paper. In general, this means to test if the distribution of ratings in a single
subset is statistically different from the unconditional distribution obtained considering the
entire sample. To do so, one computes the p-value representing the probability to observe
a given number of ratings in each community under the null hypothesis of that ratings are
distributed in the community as in the whole sample. As shown in [Tumminello et al., 2011]
the probability under the null is the hyper-geometric distribution. Moreover, since for each
community multiple tests (one for each rating and community) are performed, a correction
for the p-value for multiple hypothesis testing is used. In particular, the Bonferroni correction
is chosen, i.e. fixed a threshold ps for the p-value, the corrected threshold is given by
ps
Nr
,
where Nr is the number of tests. The threshold of is fixes at ps = 1% before correction.
Specifically, given a partition {Ci}i the following quantities are computed
kx,i = #{nodes in Ci with rating x}
ni = #{nodes in Ci}
Kx = #{nodes with rating x}
N ′ = #{nodes}
and the p-value is given by
p =
{
P(y > kx,i kx,ini >
Kx
N ′ )
P(y < kx,i kx,ini <
Kx
N ′ )
, y ∼ hypergeom
(
KL
N ′
,
KM
N ′
,
KH
N ′
;N ′
)
.
Note that {Kx} and N ′ are computed in the specific monthly network under considera-
tion.
In the case of the distribution conditioned on the distance, the subsets are obtained by
considering pairs of nodes. For example, the fraction of nodes with rating L at distance k
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from H is computed as
p
(k)
HL =
|{(i, j) : d(i, j) = k, i ∈ H, j ∈ L}|
|{(i, j) : d(i, j) = k, i ∈ H}| .
The partitions resulting from the other methods are very different in terms of number
and size of subsets, so to make tests comparable, only communities including at least 500
nodes with known rating. In the cases of modularity, subsets are ordered by descending size.
Note that, since each month the set of active nodes and the labelling of subsets changes, one
cannot easily compare the behaviour of a subsets across months.
Tables 10, 11, present a summary of the tests, recording for each month and risk class
the number of times the null hypothesis has been rejected, separated in over- (+) and under-
(−) representation. The last two columns contain the number classes respectively tested,
and in total (nC).
Table 10: Summary for test results: modularity
L M H
+ - + - + - tested nC95% nC
Jan 4 9 8 4 6 5 17 13 1971
Feb 5 11 9 2 9 7 20 15 1900
Mar 5 13 7 2 8 4 20 14 2070
Apr 4 9 7 3 7 6 19 14 1902
May 3 9 8 2 7 5 18 13 1856
Jun 5 12 11 3 6 6 21 15 2148
Jul 6 8 10 5 5 3 17 12 1862
Aug 5 12 8 3 8 5 21 16 2608
Sep 3 9 9 2 4 4 16 12 1879
Oct 5 11 9 2 6 4 18 13 1922
Nov 5 9 7 4 5 4 17 11 2083
Dec 3 11 10 3 7 3 19 15 2323
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Table 11: Summary for test results: hierarchy
L M H
+ - + - + - tested nC95% nC h
Jan 5 5 5 4 3 5 12 11 18 0.75
Feb 5 5 4 4 4 5 12 11 17 0.74
Mar 4 4 4 4 4 4 12 11 18 0.74
Apr 4 4 3 4 3 6 12 10 15 0.75
May 6 4 4 4 3 6 12 13 18 0.74
Jun 5 3 3 4 4 6 12 11 17 0.75
Jul 4 3 3 4 3 5 12 11 16 0.74
Aug 6 4 3 5 3 5 14 11 20 0.78
Sep 5 4 3 4 4 6 12 10 17 0.74
Oct 5 4 3 4 3 5 12 11 17 0.73
Nov 5 3 4 4 3 5 12 10 18 0.75
Dec 4 3 3 4 3 7 12 12 19 0.75
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C Classification
C.1 Data pre-processing
It is well established [Friedman et al., 2001] that rescaling/ transforming data in order them
to be ∈ [0, 1] or ∈ [−1, 1] or standardised, generally improves the performance of classifica-
tion, especially when different predictors have very different scale. So, before training the
models we perform data preprocessing, in particular:
i. for in- and out- degree we use quantile transformation of the logarithm of the degree.
This choice is explained by the aforementioned power-law tail distribution of these
quantities, and aim to avoid too scattered data;
ii. the predictors for assortativity are already ∈ [0, 1] so they do not need preprocessing;
iii. the distribution of nodes into hierarchy classes is standardised, i.e each rank is shifted
and rescaled to have mean 0 ad variance 1;
iv. the module is the only categorical variable. The usual binary transformation would
result into a new binary variable for each possible value. As we discussed before,
the number of modules is very high but a small fraction of them contains almost all
the nodes, so we only keep those that have more than 500 nodes and merge all the
remaining into a residual class;
v. quantile transformation is applied also to the log-distribution of the size.
C.2 Models training and hyper-parameter optimisation
Models training is performed using already implemented packages: for multinomial logistic
and classification trees Scikit-learn Python package [Pedregosa et al., 2011] has been em-
ployed, while for neural networks Keras Python package [Chollet et al., 2015] and Tensor-
flow [Abadi et al., 2015] have been used. However, during optimisation, the parameters that
define the architecture of the model, the so called hyper-parameters, remain fixed. For this
reason, a common practice is to train many models using different values for these hyper-
parameters and compare performance according to the chosen metric(s). A thorough discus-
sion on this topic is beyond the scope of this paper, we refer to [Bergstra and Bengio, 2012]
and related literature for detailed information.
Here we apply a simple grid search for the hyper-parameters of interest. This has been
done for both 1-step and 2-steps classifiers. The metrics we employ take into account the
domain specific interpretation of the risk classes. In particular we want to penalise more
misclassification towards lower risk classes, i.e M → L¯, H → M¯, H → L¯8, and towards
distant classes, i.e L → H¯, H → L¯. For this reason, beside the standard accuracy and
recall, we also consider weighted scores for accuracy wsacc, recall wsrec, precision wspr, which
are function of the confusion matrix C. With the notation
Cx,y = |{x→ y¯}| , C·,y =
∑
x
Cx,y, ∀x, y ∈ {L, M, H}
8X indicates the real class, while X¯ indicates the predicted class.
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wsacc =
1
C·,·
∑
x, y∈{L,M,H}
Cx,yP
acc
x,y , P
acc =
 1 −0.25 −0.5−0.75 1 −0.25
−1 −0.75 1

wsrec =
∑
x, y∈{L,M,H}
Cx,y
Cx,·
P recx,y , P
rec =
 1 −0.25 −0.75−0.75 1 −0.25
−1 −0.75 1.75

wspr =
∑
x, y∈{L,M,H}
Cx,y
C·,y
P prx,y , P
pr =
 1 −0.25 −0.75−0.75 1 −0.25
−1 −0.75 1.75

For classification trees, the hyper-parameter of interest is the depth, i.e the maximum
number of condition to be satisfied for classification (or the length of the longest path from
root to leaves). A higher value for depth results in lower training error but may lead to
over-fitting. We considered value of depth from 3 to 10. For the 1-step model, the tree with
depth 6 resulted the best choice, while for the 2-steps, the best results have been attained
with a depth of 9 for the first step tree and 5 for the second. For neural networks, the
hyper-parameters of interest are the number and size of hidden layers. As before, increasing
too much these values may lead to over-fitting. In order to avoid extremely high number of
parameters when adding layers, we consistently reduce their size as their number increases
(intuitively, the number of parameter grows as
∏
i|li|, where |li| is the size of the ith layer).
For example, in the case of 1 (hidden) layer the number of nodes is between 10 and 100,
while for two layers, it goes from 5 each to 10 each. For the 1-step model the best results
are obtained with 1 layer of 50 nodes, while for the 2-steps the best choice is 2 layers of 5
nodes each for the first step and 1 layer of 10 nodes for the second.
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